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ABSTRACT 
 
The so called party family of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have primarily been 
lumped together based on similarities in ideology (nativism) and immigration policy. 
While PRRPs’ immigration policy has attracted considerable attention from scholars, 
the other main political instrument to reach nativist objectives – cultural policy - 
remains understudied. To make research on the PRRP family more comprehensive, this 
thesis compares ideas on cultural policy between three Western European PRRPs 
(Dansk Folkeparti, Front National and Sverigedemokraterna). It turns out that two 
subgroups are distinguishable within the PRRP family, whereof one underpins their 
nativist rhetoric with political substance while the other does not. However, besides 
ideology, PRRPs also differ when it comes to other commonly used criteria in party 
family research. As discovered that these parties also differ regarding cultural policy 
ideas, their nativist ideology as the foundation for being a party family is questioned.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. A forgotten policy area 
As a response to the Greens, New left and regionalist parties, a third wave of right-wing 
extremism emerged in Europe in the early 1980s.1 “Invented” by the French National 
Front (Front National, FN), these parties are primarily distinguished from previous 
waves by how they base their exclusionary politics on a cultural “mixophobia” instead 
of on biological racism.2 The populist radical right parties (PRRPs) were initially treated 
as pariah by most other political actors.3 However, as their electoral achievements grew 
so did their political influence and right-wing extremism is currently experiencing its 
most successful period in post war Europe. Except being present in nearly all Western 
European countries, some parties, such as the Danish Peoples’ Party (Dansk Folkeparti, 
DF), have reached important government positions. Moreover, PRRPs advance both 
regarding ideological and electoral achievements. For example, the support for the 
Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD) have more than doubled since 2010.4 
 
Even if PRRPs have become a well-established feature in the political landscape, it has 
been proven problematic to assign them a common label, a theoretical definition and 
core characteristics. Several factors complicate this. For example, PRRPs originate from 
different historical, sociological and ideological roots.5 Laurenz Ennser notes that this 
could make us suspect them to be less uniform than other groups of parties.6 Still, they 
are treated as a party family by most scholars,7 which imply that family members are 
expected to share certain political viewpoints.8 PRRPs have principally been assembled 
on the ideological level, based on their current shared nativist ideology.9 In essence, 
nativism reflects the previously mentioned cultural mixophobia and concerns “the fight 
for the ‘survival of the nation’ as a culturally distinct entity and against 
                                                          
1
 Minkenberg (2000) p. 177; Mudde (2000) p. 6 
2
 Bornschier (2010) p. 25; Minkenberg 2000 p. 180 
3
 Even if these parties have been called by different names, the label PRRPs is used here. This label has 
been widely recognised in recent years (following Mudde: 2007) and well reflects current perceptions of 
the PRRP family. However, even if called PRRPs throughout the thesis, it should be clarified that some 
mentioned scholars use different labels. To avoid confusion, scholar’s use of other labels have been 
changed to “PRRPs” in cases when they 1) principally include the same set of parties as those here called 
PRRPs and/or 2) include a similar definition of the group even if labelling it differently. The reader 
should however be aware of that smaller differences between different scholars’ definitions can exist.   
4
 Minkenberg (2013) p. 9; Mudde (2000) p. 6; Mudde (2013) p. 9; Rydgren (2007) p. 242; Zaslove (2009) 
p. 309 
5
 De Lange (2007) p. 429; Ennser (2012) p. 151-152; Mudde (2007) p. 123 
6
 Ennser (2012) p. 151, 156 
7
 E.g. Betz (2003); Ennser (2012); Mudde (2007); Zaslove (2004) 
8
 Ennser (2012) p. 152 
9
 E. g. Betz (2003); Fetzer (2000); Mudde (2007) 
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multiculturalism”. 10  In other words, nativism refers to culture (in a broad 
anthropological sense) and has the protection of one’s own culture from the culture of 
others as objective (se Figure 1:1). Still, both theoretical ideas and practical political 
actions express a party’s ideological position. On the political level, elements of 
nativism are found within many policy areas. However, I argue that cultural policy11 
(when applied in its broader anthropological manner)12 is the principal instrument to 
reach nativism’s “protection of” objectives, while immigration policy is the principal 
instrument to reach its “protection from” objectives. If PRRPs’ exclusionary politics are 
based on nativism, this should thus be reflected both in their cultural and immigration 
policy. If not, even if other factors then ideology (such as national context, historical 
roots, age and parliamentary power) also influence the positioning of political parties,13  
current PRRPs’ exclusion based on cultural mixophobia could be accused for rather 
being of a discursive character. That is, a currently more acceptable strategy to refuse 
immigrants compared to the exclusion based on biological racism used by previous 
waves of right-wing extremism.14 
 
Figure 1:1 Nativist ideology and policy related to previous research on PRRPs
 
 
Previous research assumes and confirms that immigration policy is a core area for 
PRRPs and that they have similar objectives with it. On a political level, immigration 
policy is highlighted as the primary uniting feature for the party family and only PRRPs 
                                                          
10
 Davies and Jackson (2008), p. 108 
11
 Not to be confused with cultural politics. While cultural politics refers to all political actions relevant to 
culture, cultural policy only includes political action within the scope of a State’s cultural department 
(Harding 2007, p. 11) 
12
 See chapter 4.1. 
13
 Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211; Meret (2010) p. 316-317; Minkenberg (2013b) p. 5 
14
 Bornschier (2010) p. 25; Minkenberg 2000 p. 180 
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POLICY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAIN INSTRUMENTS            PRRPs MAIN 
 (WHAT SHOULD BE) INTERESTS 
                  (WHAT IS) 
 
Nativism 
cultural mixophobia 
Protection of 
own culture 
Cultural policy 
Understudied 
(cultural policy 
not confirmed) 
Protection from 
other cultures 
Immigration 
policy 
Immigraton 
policy 
(confirmed) 
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that mobilize grievances over immigration gain electoral success.15 Thus, PRRPs meet 
the “protection from” part of nativism. Indeed, when going through research on PRRPs, 
immigration policy has undoubtedly gained the greatest share of attention.16 However, 
PRRPs are not single issue parties.17 As mentioned, scholars have also noted PRRPs’ 
cultural interest.18 However, their primary focus has been on how PRRPs base their 
exclusive politics on cultural arguments, rather than on investigating the substance 
behind those arguments.19 Apart from assumptions about shared cultural interest and 
objectives based on nativism, such substance is indicated by scholars such as Michael 
Minkenberg, who shows that cultural policies are where these parties are most 
influential when holding executive office. 20  However, research on PRRPs’ cultural 
policy, as on cultural policy in general, remains very sparse. 21  A reason for this 
sparseness could be that cultural policy is not a central area for general political parties 
and rarely gets an eminent role in national election campaigns.22 To be able to confirm 
that PRRPs meet the “protection of” part of nativism on more than a rhetorical level, 
their cultural policy has to be further investigated.  
 
What makes the absence of cultural policy research further problematic is that the 
PRRPs (beside shared immigration policy and current ideology) do not meet other 
normally used criteria to identify a party family such as shared historical, sociological 
and ideological roots. That is, if we discover that PRRPs do neither have similar ideas 
on cultural policy, it seems appropriate to question their (assumed) shared nativist 
ideology together with their so called party family.   
 
1.2. Purpose and research question 
 
Research on PRRPs’ cultural policy remains sparse. This is surprising considering that 
cultural policy combined with immigration policy should be the main political 
instruments for PRRPs to reach the family’s core ideological objective of nativism. The 
aim of this thesis is to make research on the PRRP family more comprehensive by 
critically examine those ideas that have been said to compose the basis of the PRRP 
family. More specifically, by exploring if PRRPs also resemble each other when it 
comes to the “protection of” part of nativism - cultural policy. To do so, the cultural 
policy of three Western European PRRPs (DF, FN and SD) is compared in terms of 
importance, cultural range and objectives. Depending on the parties’ resemblance, the 
appropriateness in calling the PRRPs a party family is discussed. Departing from this 
                                                          
15
 Immerzeel et al. (2015) p. 1; Ivarsflaten (2008) p. 17 
16
 Immerzeel et al. (2015) p. 1 
17
 Mudde (2007) p. 19 
18
 I. e. Minkenberg (2000, 2001); Mudde (2007) 
19
 Bornschier (2010) p. 25, 49; Minkenberg (2000, 2001) 
20
 Minkenberg (2001) p. 1 
21
 Von Beyme (2014) p. 101 
22
 Frenander (2007) p. 403 
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purpose, the research question is formulated as follows:  
 
How does the positioning of PRRPs regarding importance, understanding and 
objectives of cultural policy affect the appropriateness in calling them a party 
family? 
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2. POLITICAL PARTY FAMILIES 
 
To facilitate the international comparison of national political parties, similar parties are 
commonly gathered in cross country subgroups. However, parties are often lumped 
together based on a priori assumptions rather than on systematic analytical 
examinations.
23
 In political science, so-called party families provide ideal types for 
political parties. The identification of parties in families should thus be considered as a 
stereotypic reflection of reality based on a (non-existent) ideal party.
24
 Even if this 
implies that no parties are identical, all family members will share core features.
25
 The 
model provides both practical and theoretical advantages. Practically, it is a rather 
concrete and easily comprehensible tool. Theoretically, it facilitates the international 
comparison of national political parties by highlighting shared core objectives and 
identities. By doing so, it provides a cross country theoretical definition for national 
parties and thus communicates what parties are in an international context.
26
 As 
explained by Peter Mair and Cas Mudde (1998), “it is only by identifying links and 
equivalences among parties in different polities that we can get a proper sense of what 
should and what should not be compared or of what is like and unlike”.27  
 
To decide whether parties with apparently similar core characteristics should be 
gathered in a family, they are compared according to relevant criteria such as origins 
and sociology, transnational federations, policy and ideology and name (see next 
chapter).
28
 Those parties that meet the pre-established criteria are considered a family, 
as were parties in the widely recognized Liberal, Conservative, Socialist and Christian 
Democratic families.
29
 But how to decide what the relevant criteria are or the core 
characteristics? And how much similarity between parties would be reasonable to 
expect? Beside such basic questions, scholars working with the concept have to deal 
with questions such as how many party families there should be (decisive for how broad 
and permissive each family are), how to distinguish clear borders between them and 
how to handle changing or unstable political parties. These questions remain 
unanswered, as the concept is still rather vague and undertheorised.
30
   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 214; Mudde (2000), p. 2. 
24
Esaiasson et al. (2012) p. 139-140 
25
 Mudde (2007) p. 13 
26
 Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 215, 225; Mudde (2000), p. 1 
27
 Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 212 
28
 Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211 
29
 Mudde (2000), p. 2 
30
 Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 211, 221-223, Mudde (2000), p. 2. 
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2.1. A problematic set of classification criteria 
 
Different scholars have used different criteria to classify parties in families. Klaus von 
Beyme’s (1985) classification of Western political parties in different familles 
spirituelles was for long precedential in the field. Here, conclusions about parties’ 
ideological orientations were drawn on the basis of party name in combination with 
voters’ understanding of parties’ ideological position and program.31 The idea is that a 
party’s name should reflect its ideological identity. However in practice, similar parties 
chose very different names. Moreover, both criteria share the problem of only being 
indirect classifications, as they are not based on systematic scientific analysis but on 
(possibly incorrect) assumptions.
32
 
 
More recent guiding classification criteria were listed by Michael Gallagher et al. 
(1995), who grouped parties based on genetic origin, transnational federations and 
policies.
33
 Here, parties with origins in similar historical circumstances or social 
conflicts are said to share genetic origins.
34
 However, to assemble current parties based 
on history is problematic as parties often change and depart from original values.
35
 
Further on, the criterion requires cross country comparable historical events, which 
make its use difficult outside of Western Europe.
36
 Transnational federations assemble 
parties based on their associations in international political contexts such as the 
European parliament.
37
 However, all parties do not take part in such, nor do they 
organize according to the party family-lines.
38
 The last criterion, policies, assembles 
parties based on policy resemblance.
39
 Policies do however not necessarily translate into 
the same thing across borders, which make also this criterion problematic. 
 
In 1998, Mair and Mudde summarized the most relevant criteria found in previous 
research through the categories origins and sociology, transnational federations, policy 
and ideology and name. Here, origins and sociology corresponds to Gallagher et al.’s 
genetic origin and policy and ideology corresponds to Gallagher et al.’s policies.40 
These four criteria will henceforth be used in this thesis. Mair and Mudde primarily 
recommend the use of the criteria origins and sociology and policy and ideology when 
studying party families. These are considered as least problematic based on previous 
problems, and are suggested to best reveal relevant information about parties as they 
“tap into what parties are rather than what parties do and hence are more likely to 
uncover core identities and shared political goals”.41  
 
Moreover, the renaming policies into policy and ideology solves its main problem (i.e. 
difficulties to compare policies across countries). Instead of only focusing on policy, 
                                                          
31
 Von Beyme (1985) p. 3. 
32
 Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 220-221; Mudde (2000) p. 3 
33
 Gallagher et al. (1995) p. 181.  
34
 Mudde (2000) p. 3 
35
 Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 215; Mudde (2000) p. 3 
36
 Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 215; Mudde (2000) p. 3 
37
 Gallagher et al (1995) p. 181 
38
 Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 217; Mudde (2000) p. 4-5 
39
 Gallagher et al (1995) p. 181 
40
 Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211 
41
 Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211 
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researchers should focus on the ideology on which policies are based. In doing so, 
scholars avoid being confused by difficultly comparable national policy boundaries. As 
explained by Mudde, “[i]deologies function as the normative bases of the pursued 
policies of political parties and have the advantage of being more generally formulated 
than the more nationally centred policies that are pursued”.42 Indeed, that ideology is 
still central to identify party families is confirmed by Ennser (2012), who states that 
“[t]here is hardly a way around ideology (and party policy as its everyday 
manifestation) as a criterion for the classification of parties. All serious attempts at 
defining or classifying parties take into account the centrality of ideology”.43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42
 Mudde (2000) p. 5 
43
 Ennser (2012) p. 155 
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3. THE INCONGRUOUS FAMILY OF PRRPS 
 
3.1. Difficulties in meeting party family criteria  
 
Even if treated as a family by most scholars, the PRRPs have difficulties in meeting 
several of the previously mentioned party family criteria. This, Ennser notes, could 
make us expect the PRRPs to be less uniform than other party families.44 
 
The criterion name is not suitable for PRRPs, as Ennser notes that “for no party family 
is there (1) less (scholarly) consensus as to the exogenous labelling, and (2) greater 
discordance between exogenous and endogenous labels”.45  Further on, the study of 
PRRPs transnational federations is of small use as no attempt to coordinate these 
parties’ interests has resulted in an institutionalized transnational organization.46 
 
Difficulties with above criteria is however less important as Mair and Mudde primarily 
recommend the use of origins and sociology and policy and ideology in the study of 
party families. It is therefore more problematic that also the criterion origins and 
sociology is of limited use when it comes to PRRPs.47 First, the PRRPs originate from 
such diverse ideological roots as neo-liberalism, Nazism and fascism (and more). 
Moreover since their emergence many PRRPs have changed ideological core. Second, 
not only PRRPs emerged in the 1980s. Also the Greens emerged due to the same 
historical circumstances, and both mobilized the electorate along the GAL/TAN 
cleavage.48 Third, even if sometimes argued that these parties represent the same social 
group,49 most current scholars argue that this is not so.50  Based on problems associated 
with the other categories, it seems most suitable to study current policy and ideology 
when doing cross country comparisons of PRRPs. Indeed, previous research indicates 
that these parties share a number of core policy and ideological characteristics. This is 
developed in next chapter.   
 
 
                                                          
44
 Ennser (2012) p. 151, 156 
45
 Ennser (2012) p. 156-157 
46
 Ennser (2012) p. 154-155; Mudde (2000) p. 4-5; Norris (2005) p. 43-44 
47
 Mudde (2000) p. 3 
48
 Ennser (2012) p. 152-154; Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 215; Mudde (2000) p. 3; Zaslove (2009) p. 309. 
GAL/TAN, or  green/alternative/liberal versus traditional/authoritarian/nationalist 
49
 See for example Kühnl et al. (1969) who argues that PRRPs represents middle-class extremism or 
Kreisi et al. (2006) who argues that PRRPs represents the “losers of globalisation”.  
50
 E. g. Mudde (2000) p. 3, van der Brug & van Spanje (2009)    
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3.2. Towards a set of core characteristics  
Scholars have not agreed upon a common name or theoretical definition regarding the 
(here labelled) PRRPs. In 1996, Mudde explained that “in 26 definitions of right-wing 
extremism that are used in the literature, no less then 58 different features are mentioned 
at least once”.51 That is, even if useful to compare PRRPs regarding current policy and 
ideology (as previously established), scholars do not agree upon which such 
characteristics should be. That makes research on the party family problematic. Based 
on different theoretical definitions, different scholars include different parties in the 
PRRP family. As expressed by Mudde, “While virtually everyone agrees on the 
inclusion of some parties in this family – most notably the prototypical Front National 
(FN) in France – there is considerable debate on various others”.52 Furthermore, based 
on different definitions, parties are compared based on different characteristics.53 To 
take Ennser (2012) as an example, he compares PRRPs in the political areas taxes vs. 
spending, social policy, EU authority, environment, decentralization and immigration 
and concludes that PRRPs are a rather homogeneous party family. 54  However, if 
immigration is removed, their similarity drops.55 Except underlining the importance of 
immigration policy for PRRPs, this demonstrates the importance of analysing party 
families based on carefully selected characteristics. 
 
In summarizing the literature until 1996, Mudde explains that the five most mentioned 
political and ideological characteristics of PRRPs were nationalism, racism, 
xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state.56 On the political level, PRRPs have 
mainly been lumped together based on their hostile policies towards immigration.57 
That these parties are sometimes simply labelled anti-immigrant parties reflects this.58 
For instance, Meindert Fennema defines as PRRPs those parties that have immigration 
as core political issue in electoral campaigns.59 
 
On the ideological level, nationalism was commonly (and is sometimes still) regarded 
as PRRPs core characteristic.60  However, even if PRRPs tend to have nationalistic 
features, the concept is problematic as it concerns the nation and thus excludes 
regionalist parties. Furthermore, the concept is too broad to distinct PRRPs from parties 
with more moderate nationalist tendencies.61 Instead, many current scholars argue that 
                                                          
51
 Mudde (1996) p. 229 
52
 Mudde (2013) p. 3 
53
 Ennser (2012) p. 156 
54
 Ennser (2012) p. 167 
55
 Ennser (2012) p. 161, 167 
56
 Mudde (1996) p. 228-229 
57
 E.g. Immerzeel et al. (2015); Ivarsflaten (2008); Norris (2005); Zaslove (2004) 
58
 E. g. Gibson (2002); Fennema (1997) 
59
 As explained by van Spanje (2011) p. 306 
60
 E. g. Blokker (2005), Eatwell (2000), Immerzeel et al. (2015); Rydgren (2004) 
61
 Ennser (2012) p. 156; Mudde (2007) p. 17 
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nativism is more appropriate (further defined in next chapter). 62  Nativism is more 
specific than the broader nationalism in a manner that fits these parties. Even if nativism 
implies xenophobia and hostility towards immigration, it has the advantage of not 
necessarily involving racist arguments as it does not rank cultures (even if stating that 
cultures should not be mixed).63  
 
In sum, PRRPs are primarily lumped together based on immigration policy and 
nativism. However, research has not focused on cultural policy, which is surprising as 
cultural policy combined with immigration policy should be the main political 
instruments to reach nativist ideological objectives (see Figure 1:1). Before giving a 
more full description of the PRRPs, it should be mentioned that every scholar does not 
treat PRRPs as a family. Joost van Spanje argues that these parties should be regarded as 
two families, of which one is assembled based on anti-immigration policies and the 
other on right-wing ideology (both when it comes to the socio-economical and the 
GAL/TAN cleavage). That is, he objects to the literature where the terms are used 
interchangeably, by arguing that these parties cannot be assembled based on both 
ideology and policy.64 
 
 
3.3. The populist radical right: focus on nativism 
Even if the definition of PRRPs is still debated, PRRPs have more in common than 
immigration policy and nativism. Providing what has been called “the most well-
founded attempt at defining the radical right (populist) ideology to date”,65  Mudde 
argues that PRRPs’ core ideological characteristic is nativism, combined with 
authoritarianism and populism.66 
In essence, nativism reflects PRRPs cultural mixophobia, refers to a broad 
anthropological understanding of culture, and has the protection of one’s own culture 
from the culture of others as objective. Mudde defines nativism as; 
an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the 
native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are 
fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state. The basis for defining (non) 
‘nativeness’ can be diverse, e.g. ethnic, racial or religious, but will always have a cultural 
component.
67
 
 
                                                          
62
 E. g. Betz (2003); Fetzer (2000); Mudde (2007) 
63
 Mudde (2007) p. 19 
64
 Van Spanje (2011) p. 294, 297, 318 
65
 Ennser (2012) p. 156 
66
 Mudde (2007) p. 26. 
67
 Mudde (2007) p. 19 
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An important part of nativism is that it concerns a version of pluralism which highly 
values cultural differentiation. PRRPs ethnopluralist view implies that cultures are seen 
as equal but different. Thus, hostile attitudes towards non-native elements are not based 
on that national culture is seen as superior, but on a perceived incompatibility of 
cultures. Preferences for national culture is simply based upon that it is one’s own, and 
PRRPs commonly states that they defend the human right of cultural identity, or 
similar.
68
 For instance, SD writes that “[t]he unique and diverse identities that 
humanity’s different peoples and ethnic groups exhibit are dictated by their respective 
cultures. The different cultures are the common heritage of humanity and should be 
recognized and protected for everyone’s benefit”. 69  SD calls their statement “a 
commitment to global cultural diversity”,70 and nativism can thus appear permissive. 
However, as the preserving of national cultures’ entails a cultural mixophobia, the 
multicultural society is perceived as a threat. The culture perceived as most threatening 
to European culture and identity is Islam.71 As expressed by Michael Minkenberg, “its 
essence is a politically enforced segregation of cultures and ethnicities according to 
geographical criteria”.72 Similarly, Hans-Georg Betz states that nativism implies a very 
narrow approach to citizenship and entails a justification for exclusionary policies based 
on culture.
73
 
 
As previously explained, PRRPs are also said to share the characteristics 
authoritarianism and populism. With authoritarianism, Mudde means that these parties 
strive towards a society with a strict hierarchical order. In his own words, 
authoritarianism is “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of 
authority are to be punished severely”.74 Populism implicates a worldview of a divided 
society where PRRPs represent “the pure people” who are suppressed by a “corrupt 
elite”. Politics should instead of being designed by the elite, be designed according to 
the general will of the people.
75
 It should also be mentioned that Mudde explains that 
PRRPs are radical but not extreme. While extremist parties are anti-constitutional, this 
is not the case for the radical PRRPs even if they deviate from liberal democracies by 
their cultural mixophobia.
76  
 
 
 
                                                          
68
 Betz (2003) p. 196; Mudde (2007) p. 18  
69
 Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 19. All citations from political documents are translated from original 
language by the author. 
70
 Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 20 
71
 Betz (2003) p. 204; Davies & Jackson (2008), p. 108 
72
 Minkenberg (2000) p. 180 
73
 Betz (2003) p. 194-195 
74
 Mudde (2007) p. 23 
75
 Mudde (2007) p. 23 
76
 Mudde (2007) p. 24; Zaslove (2009) p. 310 
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4. CULTURAL POLICY 
Cultural policy concerns a state’s institutionalized involvement in- and support to the 
area of culture. Cultural policy is thus not creative as such but bureaucratic and 
concerns actions such as distribution of founding and the development, implementation 
and evaluation of projects and regulations. 77  As pointed out by Anders Frenander 
(2014), cultural policy is expected to unite “such extreme contrasts as bureaucracy and 
art, the most conventional with the most radical”.78 
 
Further on, cultural policy design is closely connected to ideology and to ideas of what 
makes up an ideal society.79 Even if modern democratic states’ official general aim is to 
neither influence the content nor style of artists, it is questionable whether this is 
possible as governments decide which projects should be supported.80 Toby Miller and 
George Yúdice (2002) even argue that “cultural policy always implies the management 
of populations through suggested behaviour”.81 Cultural policy is thus described as a 
project which educates citizens when it comes to behaviour and taste, and creates a 
common identity within a society. The importance of identity is underlined as 
identification creates collective loyalty.82  
 
4.1. Range of cultural policy 
The range of cultural policy varies both between national contexts and political actors. 
According to range, cultural policy will embed different action possibilities and can 
therefore be used in a more or less creative way. First, actors’ range can vary regarding 
importance accorded to cultural policy. In its most extreme, actors can minimize the 
state’s cultural influence by exercising a passive cultural policy (i.e. minimum state 
intervention).
83
  In contrast, actors can promote an extensive cultural policy – for 
example to be use cultural policy for ideological objectives such as nativism. 
 
Other variations between actors’ range are connected to the complex cultural concept. 
Indeed, it has been described as being one of the most complex concepts in the English 
language
84
. In cultural policy, culture is primarily associated with an aesthetical 
meaning. However, the range of cultural policy can be wider and include an 
anthropological meaning of culture. Indeed, the employment of a wider understanding 
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of cultural policy has increased.
85
 Figure 4.1:1 provides examples of cultural 
expressions associated with the aesthetical and anthropological understandings of 
culture.  The narrower aesthetical understanding of culture is the more traditional of the 
two  and  concerns  creative peoples’  artistic  output   and  its  study.  Typically  artistic 
expressions associated to 
the aesthetical cultural 
understanding are visual 
arts, theatre, music, dance, 
literature, and architecture. 
Compared to the more  
anthropological culture, 
aesthetical is associated 
with universal higher 
values and valuation of 
taste.
86
 As explained by 
Miller and Yúdice, “in this 
world, culture is taken as a 
marker of differences and 
similarities in taste and 
status within social 
groups”.87 
 
The broad anthropological 
understanding of culture 
implies a society’s whole 
way of life. Such culture is 
     Figure 4.1:1Culture associated to different cultural understandings 
 
Understanding of 
culture 
Examples of cultural 
areas 
Aesthetical  Visual arts 
Theatre 
Film 
Music 
Dance 
Literature 
Architecture 
Education in the arts 
Anthropological Art (all above areas) 
Language 
Religion 
Traditions 
Customs 
Education 
Sports 
Media 
 
generated from cultural and natural conditions, and consists of all human behaviour not 
determined by nature. Except art, it includes all behaviours that actors acquire just from 
being part of a society such as habits, language, skills, customs, morals, knowledge and 
faith. The anthropological understanding do thus refer to a plurality of cultures (one for 
every society) and differences in-between societies, while the aesthetical have more of a 
universal meaning and refers to differences within societies.
88
 
 
4.2. Objectives of cultural policy 
 
Based on actors’ different range of cultural policy, their objectives concerning what 
kind of culture to support will vary. In order to understand an actor’s objectives, it is 
useful to compare their cultural statements with pre-established typologies. However, 
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previous literature primarily use typologies with focus on the management of cultural 
policy, with categories such as degree of state intervention, degree of central 
management, relations between cultural actors or models of distribution.
89
 A more 
suitable way to investigate aesthetical and anthropological objectives could possibly be 
based on cultural ideologies.
90
 However, as political actors tend to have elements of 
many cultural ideologies, a strict classification based in ideology risks to be forced.
91
   
 
Instead, Per Mangset argues that it is better to compare political actors when it comes to 
cultural conflict lines.
92
 Mangset argues that the ten most important conflict lines are 
public direction/free market, public control/complete freedom of expression, social 
security (welfare)/cultural freedom of expression (creativity), quality 
(professional)/similarity (amateur), elite culture/popular culture, expert rule 
(profession)/rule of the people (democracy), cultural creativity/bureaucratic 
organization, traditional/innovatory, national/international and central rule/local 
rule.
93
 However, all of these do not concern cultural aesthetical or anthropological 
objectives. A typology based on these conflict lines was therefore constructed including 
three relevant conflict lines: elite culture/popular culture, national/international and 
traditional/innovatory.
94
 Mangset’s conflict lines however concern the aesthetical 
understanding of culture (which makes sense based on general political actor’s 
aesthetical focus).
95
 As PRRPs cultural range is not yet explored, Mangset’s aesthetical 
categories are supplemented with corresponding anthropological. The developed 
typology is displayed in figure 4.2:1 and will later be used in the analysis. To make the 
categories more comprehensive, they are sorted based on dimension (class-related, 
geographical or temporal). It should also be mentioned that the categories are theoretical 
ideal types. In practice, political actors’ cultural objectives are generally a mix of these. 
   Figure 4.2:1. Main conflicting cultural objectives in cultural policy  
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Dimension (aesthetical or anthropological) Conflict line (aesthetical or anthropological) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Class-related High culture 
Popular culture  
 
Geographical  
International culture 
National culture 
Regional culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Temporal Traditional culture 
Innovatory culture 
Note: Categorisation based on Mangset’s 
(1992) cultural conflict lines, adapted to 
reflect aesthetical and anthropological 
cultural objectives 
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Conflict lines on the class-related dimension: high/popular culture  
 
The class-related dimension concerns whose culture the state should support with 
cultural policy. While the high culture is associated to culture of the upper social strata, 
popular culture is associated to culture of the lower social strata. According to Pierre 
Bourdieu, the upper social strata tries to culturally discern itself from lower strata by 
taking part in advanced and demanding aesthetical and anthropological (high) cultural 
activities inaccessible for others. Popular culture is more accessible and less 
demanding.
96
 A paternalistic cultural policy is often involved in high culture, as argued 
to be good for citizens’ wellbeing and moral and spiritual education.97 An aesthetical 
understanding of the conflict line concern priorities between “serious artistic 
expressions of good taste” (high culture) and “accessible entertainment” (popular 
culture).
98
 An anthropological understanding concerns priorities between whose 
lifestyle to support and thus reproduce.  
 
Conflict lines on the geographical dimension: international/national/regional culture 
 
The geographical dimension concerns the scope of cultural policy. Should the state 
primarily promote a homogeneous or multicultural national culture (where the latter can 
include the cultures of both national and foreign minorities)? The homogeneous 
alternative is closely connected to the fostering of a culturally distinctive national 
identity. Political actors do here use cultural policy to protect special national features, 
and to promote national prestige. Even if such policy can be perceived as propaganda, it 
is (in non-exaggerated proportions) a common feature in most nations.
99
 An aesthetical 
understanding of the conflict concerns priorities between international, national and 
regional artistic expressions. An anthropological understanding concerns priorities 
between international, national and regional lifestyle(s).  
 
 Conflict lines on the temporal dimension: traditional/innovative culture  
 
The temporal dimension concerns if cultural policy should support historically 
established culture or create opportunities for innovative cultural expressions. 
Traditional cultural expressions should however not be confused with high culture, 
even if often including high culture. The conflict line is connected to political actor’s 
view on society, and if they focus on protecting what is or developing what can be.
100
  
An aesthetical understanding concerns priorities between support of historically 
established or innovative art and concerns both expressions and techniques. An 
anthropological understanding concerns if traditional or innovative lifestyles should be 
exposed and promoted. 
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5. WHAT ABOUT PRRPS AND THE “PROTECTION 
OF” PART OF NATIVISM?  
- AN INCOMPLETE DISCUSSION 
  
As described, scholars have recognized that PRRPs base their exclusive politics on 
cultural arguments. 101  However, research on the substance behind those arguments 
remains sparse. As far as I am aware of, no research on the PRRP family gives special 
attention to cultural policy. When scholars focus on PRRP’s culture, the culture 
considered is primarily PRRPs’ culture of authoritarianism. Thus, when Simon 
Bornschier (2010) finds considerable cultural similarities between PRRPs, he does not 
refer to the aesthetical/anthropological culture relevant for nativist objectives, but to 
cultural authoritarianism relevant for the GAL/TAN cleavage.
102
 
 
Some scholars do however shed light on certain aspects of the area. To begin with, 
research and theory confirms that PRRPs should show strong interest in cultural policy. 
Besides that PRRPs themselves emphasizes their cultural interest in terms of 
ethnopluralism,
103
 cultural policy should be a core instrument for PRRPs to reach 
nativist objectives (see Figure 1:1). Moreover, PRRPs have reason to emphasize cultural 
objectives for electoral reasons, as far-right preferences are more common among those 
voters who perceive a cultural threat than those who perceive an economic threat from 
immigration.
104
  
 
Further on, research indicates that PRRPs have a genuine interest and influence in 
cultural policy. Mudde (2007) observes that PRRPs emphasize symbolic measures such 
as cultural politics when achieving power.
105
 Importantly, he notes that this is a general 
theme in writing that “one of the few points standing out among virtually all cases of 
populist radical right rule at the local level is the emphasis on symbolic measures”.106 
Moreover, when Minkenberg (2001) investigates the political impact of PRRPs in four 
countries (France, Italy, Austria and Germany), he concludes that when they hold 
executive office, “a 'right turn' occurs primarily in cultural policies”.107  
 
The (sparse) literature thus indicates a genuine interest and influence of PRRPs in 
cultural policy. Questions concerning how their influence is used and based on what 
objectives are thus actualized. Mudde states that some of the most important practical 
consequences of PRRPs influence in the area are “the renaming of streets, the increase 
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of national symbols in the cities, and the redistribution of local subsidies”. 108 
Minkenberg provides examples from several countries of how PRRPs’ influence has 
been used. When FN held power in French municipalities, he explains that public 
libraries were cleansed. Moreover, 
 
 the cultural life in the cities governed by the FN underwent a severe transformation. Many 
cultural projects (theatre groups, music festivals, cinemas, clubs, coffee shops and so on) 
had to abandon their activities for lack of funding or withdrawal of their licence, bi-national 
marriages were blocked, and anti-FN activities were suppressed at the expense of civil 
liberties.
109
 
 
Minkenberg also accounts for cultural reforms that took place when the Freedom Party 
of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) and conservatives formed an Austrian 
coalition government. 
 
FPÖ has insisted on including in the coalition agreement support for a new field of 
university research called Volkskultur and launched several attempts to push for the 
revitalisation of the concept of Heimat. This is part of a larger assault by Haider [Jörg 
Haider, former leader of FPÖ] on modern culture and his efforts to save Austria's 'real' art 
and culture from subversive counter-culture and 'leftwing cultural fascism' by eliminating 
cultural autonomy from the political realm.
110
 
 
As Minkenberg’s focus is to describe the general political impact of PRRPs, little 
attention is paid to their cultural objectives. Minkenberg only touches upon this when he 
links the political behaviour of PRRPs to their general focus on the nation and 
nationhood.
111
 However, the connection is only made briefly and inexhaustively. More 
importantly, it considers the politics of PRRPs in general and not cultural politics in 
particular. However when it comes to FBÖ, Minkenberg explains that their cultural 
policy “aims at 'liberating' Austria from the political left and from 'foreignisation' by 
reasserting the ethnocultural roots of the country”.112 This is linked to an ethnocratic 
ideology, characterized by “its völkisch elements of a homogenous community of 
Austrians”.113  
 
Similarly, Mudde explains the PRRPs’ actions in the cultural policy area with nativist 
objectives. According to Mudde, it is only when PRRPs discovers that power is 
particularly limited when it comes to “nativist policies at the core of their program”, that 
they refocus on cultural policy.114 Furthermore, their practical cultural influence is in all 
cases used “away from ‘alien’ and ‘antinational’ (e.g. leftwing and minority) individuals 
and organizations and towards ‘national’ or ‘patriotic’ actors”.115 However, Mudde only 
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briefly accounts for cultural policy and his arguments are not further developed. Indeed, 
the connection he makes between PRRPs’ cultural politics and nativism do rather seem 
to be based on what seems logic considering PRRPs’ nativist core, then on an actual 
analytic comparison between PRRPs’ political positions.  
 
Finally, in line with Mudde and Minkenberg, Rebecka Dittmer (2008) links FN’s 
previously mentioned cleansing of public libraries to their aim to protect a French 
national identity. In a larger political context, Dittmer argues that this should be 
regarded as one part of a broader cultural strategy.
116
 As previous scholars, her analysis 
is however not enough developed to take the argumentation further. 
 
To summarize the literature on PRRPs and cultural policy, it indicates that PRRPs have 
a genuine interest and are influential in the area. It also names examples of specific 
cultural areas where these parties have been active, which together indicates a focus on 
increasing national symbols, national cultural expressions and cultural heritage. Further 
on, their focus is explained by references to the nation and nativism. In the words used 
in this thesis, research thus indicates that PRRPs have a broader anthropological 
understanding of cultural policy. When it comes to cultural conflict lines (see Figure 
4.2:1), it indicates that PRRPs have national cultural focus on the geographical 
dimension. Objectives on the class-related- and temporal dimension remains more 
unclear.   
 
However, the literature is too sparse and vague to draw convincing conclusions. 
Research does not provide an extensive analyse concerning PRRPs’ cultural interest, 
understanding and objectives. For example regarding cultural objectives, these are only 
vaguely formulated in terms of the nation and nativism and should rather be seen as 
general objectives for PRRPs than for PRRPs cultural policy in particular. As argued, 
statements about cultural objectives rather seem based on what seems logic considering 
PRRPs nativist ideological core, then on a deeper analysis. Moreover, previous research 
focuses on outcomes of PRRPs cultural policy. As argued in chapter 3.1., research on 
the PRRP family should focus on policy and ideology. To do so, a wider empirical 
material than the study of political outcomes is suitable. As no PRRP has (so far) 
possessed a majority of governmental seats, political outcomes will only demonstrate 
what reforms PRRPs was able to implement when negotiating with other parties. That 
is, it will not show what PRRPs are (which Mudde highlights as essential to uncover 
core identities and political goals),117 as would research on what PRRPs would do if 
they had the possibility. To confirm that PRRPs also meet the “protection of” part of 
nativism, research on their cultural policy must be more exhaustive and based on a 
wider empirical material than on political outcomes. 
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6. METHODS  
6.1. Research design 
Research on PRRPs cultural policy remains sparse. To further investigate the area, the 
approach of this study is exploratory.
118
 Mudde writes that, even if the most used 
method when comparing party families is quantitative content analysis, it is more 
suitable to use a qualitative approach when studying core features of party ideology.
119
 
Quantitative content analysis “primarily code policy initiatives, which often translate 
only marginally to complex ideological features. Moreover, the strict coding scheme 
leads to conceptual rigidity”.120 When it comes to complex phenomena like features of 
party ideology, a qualitative approach gives the researcher greater opportunity to 
properly understand them.
121
 For example, the researcher will have larger possibilities 
to distinguish primary from secondary ideological features and to be flexible when 
coding complex ideologies such as nativism.
122
  
 
Several qualitative methods can be used to analyse empirical material. However, both 
argument analysis and discourse analysis require that the researcher have further initial 
knowledge about the subject of analysis than is the case here.
123
 As here, when the 
subject of analysis is relatively unexplored, a more elemental qualitative idea- or 
ideology analysis is appropriate. Even if this thesis’ overarching objective is to say 
something about PRRPs assumed nativist ideology, this is done by identifying ideas in 
cultural policy. That is, PRRP’s ideas concerning importance of cultural policy, cultural 
understanding and cultural policy objectives. Therefore, this thesis makes use of a 
qualitative analysis of ideas. It should however be emphasised that aggregated ideas do 
form the overarching ideology.
124
 Furthermore, the analysis will be comparative as it is 
necessary to compare parties to discover if they share core characteristics – a 
fundamental feature in the study of party families.
125
  
 
Finally, the thesis is based on the approach of social constructionism. Culture and taste 
are thus not considered as given by nature, but dependant on social education.
126
 
Therefore, cultural policy can be used by actors to construct change.
127
 This corresponds 
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to the statement of Miller and Yúdice, who writes that “cultural policy [is] dedicated to 
producing subjects via the formation of repeatable styles of conduct”.128 
 
6.2. Case selection  
To choose cases, relevant Western European PRRPs were first identified. Besides 
generally being considered to be PRRPs, relevant parties were assessed to be those with 
sufficiently electoral support to be present in national parliaments (and thus having 
certain political influence).129 Based on the criteria set out by Mudde (2007, see chapter 
3.3.), Figure 6.2:1 identifies the main current PRRPs in Western Europe. 
Figure 6.2:1. Main current Western European PRRPs’ highest and latest electoral results from national general 
elections, 1980 - 2015  
Country Party Highest result Latest result 
Austria Alliance for the Future 
of Austria 
Austrian Freedom Party 
10.7 
 
26.9 
3.53 
 
20.5 
Belgium Flemish Interest 12.0 3.67  
Denmark Danish People’s Party 13.8 12.3 
France  National Front 15.3 13.6 
Germany The Republicans 2.1 0.2 
Greece Popular Orthodox Rally 5.6 1.0 
Italy Northern League 10.1 4.1 
Netherlands Party for Freedom 15.5 10.1 
Portugal National Renovator Party 0.3 0.3 
Sweden Sweden Democrats 12.9 12.9 
Switzerland Swiss People’s Party 28.9 26.6 
United Kingdom United Kingdom Independence Party 12.6 12.6 
 
Note: The figure is an updated version of Mudde’s (2013, p. 3). The parties’ latest electoral results are 
updated based on information from Álvarez-Rivera (2015). 
 
The three cases that will be analyzed in this thesis are the Danish’ DF, the French’ FN 
and the Swedish’ SD. These parties are all among the Western European PRRPs with 
the highest electoral support. They should thus, based on previous research, share a 
nativist ideological core and focus on immigration policy (see Figure 1:1). That is, 
previous research shows that they meet the party family criteria policy and ideology.130 
In this thesis it is however argued that their shared nativism also should generate 
similarities in cultural policy. To test whether this is true and to allow for a result 
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somewhat generalizable for the party family, the cases were chosen based on their 
differences when it comes to other criteria used in party family research (i.e. origins and 
sociology, transnational federations and name).131 Concerning origins and sociology, 
especially parties’ ideological roots are expected to leave traces because of path 
dependency, which implies that early standpoints in the party’s history are hard to 
change. 132  The parties’ different national contexts should also be empathized, as it 
provides a framework of how parties value and think about cultural policy. Except 
criteria used in party family research, the category of parliamentary power is further 
added as expected to affect the parties’ radicalism due to taming effects. When 
marginalized, a party’s ideology tends to radicalize while embracing its anti-
establishment position and while it do not have to consider inter-party negotiations and 
responsibilities.133 Figure 4.2:1 accounts for these differences. If the analysis show that 
the three cases are similar also when it comes to cultural policy despite their differences, 
this indicates that they are a unified family based on something stronger – in this case 
their supposedly shared nativism. 
Figure 6.2:2 Characteristics of FN, SD and DF 
 FN  SD DF 
Country France Sweden Denmark 
Complete name National Front Sweden Democrats Danish People’s Party 
Origins and sociology Founded in 1972 
Mixed right-wing 
Founded in 1988 
Nazism 
Founded in 1995 
Anti-tax, Neo-liberalism 
Transnational federations Non-attached 
Members  
(no group) 
Europe of Freedom 
and Direct 
Democracy   
European 
Conservatives and 
Reformists 
Parliamentary power Weak Moderate Strong 
 
Note: Considered transnational federation is here group in the European Parliament. Information about 
party group is collected from European Parliament (2015) 
 
FN is said to have invented the ethnopluralism of PRRPs and is often described as a 
prototype for the party family.134 When founded in 1972, it unified numerous right-wing 
sects and clubs such as Action Française, Le mouvement Poujade and L’Organisation 
de l’Armée Secrète around conservative and national-revolutionary ideas.135 Except for 
being among the oldest PRRPs, FN was for long the most important and radical. 
However, they did not enter the French National Assembly until 1986.136 Even if getting 
fairly high electoral support, they have so far never reached stronger parliamentary 
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power. Their current two of 577 seats in the National Assembly gives them small 
opportunities to get through with parliamentary motions. Still, they use their seats to 
make their message heard by involving in debates and asking questions.137  
 
When founded in 1988, SD both consisted of former members of Keep Sweden Swedish 
(Behåll Sverige Svenskt) with clear links to Nazism, and Nazi and fascist veterans.138 
Even if such Nazi roots remain unofficial, SD also had links “with a fairly extensive 
range of contemporary Nazi or white power groups”.139 With time, SD got rid of most 
such influences and entered parliament in 2010.  Even if treated like pariah by other 
political actors, they currently hold the balance of power in the Swedish government 
and are therefore assessed to have moderate parliamentary power.140 In the European 
Parliament, they are part of the group Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy. 
 
DF originated from the Danish Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet) in 1995, which at the 
time was an anti-tax and neo-liberal party. 141  After their entering in the Danish 
parliament in 1998, they have obtained a fairly strong parliamentary power. Except from 
being generally accepted by other political actors, they were the official support party of 
the former Liberal and Conservative government.142 In the European Parliament, they 
are part of the group Conservatives and Reformists. 
 
 
6.3. Level of analysis  
As explained, Mair and Mudde (1998) argue that the study of policy and ideology is 
suitable when examining party families.143  By focusing on ideology when studying 
separate policy areas, core party identities will emerge as “[i]deologies function as the 
normative bases of the pursued policies”.144 That party ideology is reflected in cultural 
policy is confirmed by Elisabeth Wolf-Csanády (1998). After having analysed political 
parties’ cultural values, she concludes that parties’ ideas on cultural policy are “rather 
strongly embedded in their general outlook or ideology [and] their vision of a 'good 
society'”.145 
                                                          
137
 Based on information from Assemblée Nationale (2015) 
138
 Anders Widfeldt (2014) p. 181-182 
139
 Anders Widfeldt (2014) p. 181-182 
140
 Based on information from Sveriges Riksdag (2015) 
141
 Meret (2010) p. 22, 95, 101 
142
 Meret (2010) p. 317 
143
 Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211 
144
 Mudde (2000) p. 5 
145
 Wolf-Csanády (1998) p, 398 
27 
 
This thesis’ level of analysis is thus in-between policy and 
ideology. As described, even though the overarching 
objective is to say something about PRRPs assumed 
nativist ideology, it is done by examining ideas in 
cultural policy. More specifically, this thesis’ focus is on 
the doctrine of chosen PRRPs (see Figure 6.3:1).  
 
Marie Demker (1993) uses the term doctrine in the sense 
of being a link between ideology and political actions.146 
She explains that ideology consists of postulates and 
doctrine, which both decide a party’s more practical 
political positions. The postulates are the more abstract 
foundation of the ideology and consist of constitutive 
values, beliefs and perceptions of reality. As such, it set 
the framework for, guide and legitimate interpretations of 
the political reality - the doctrine. The doctrine is more 
flexible vis-a-vis the political reality, consists of time-
bound and concrete desires and demands, and is reflected 
in verbal statements. 147  Indeed, in focusing on the 
doctrine of the chosen PRRPs, the previously explained 
danger in focusing on policy and ideology - that policy 
areas’ content somewhat vary between countries - should  
be avoided. 
 
6.4. Material  
Based on the chosen cases and level for analysis, the empirical material should reflect 
the doctrine of DF, FN and SD. Even if interviews or statements by political 
commentators, party leaders, party members or voters are thinkable sources when 
studying parties, Mudde (2007) argues that this reduces a party’s complexity. A doctrine 
is the product of several actors and processes, and can thus only be fully examined by 
material produced by (or representative for) the national party itself – that is, how it 
represents itself in official party literature. Except excluding organisations or actors 
closely associated to the party, this excludes material produced by local party 
organizations.
148
 Studied documents are therefore DF’s, FN’s and SD’s official party 
literature on cultural policy, as expressed through their own channels or in the national 
parliament.
149
 Moreover, as the focus is on current doctrine, the empirical material 
should not be dated.  
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Stances mediated through official party literature can however be accused for being 
“polished” to attract voters and thus potentially hide a more radical agenda. However, 
Mudde (2000) underlines that this is true for all parties, not only for PRRPs.
150
 
Furthermore, official literature should better reflect party doctrine than external actors’ 
assumptions about hidden agendas. Still, the reader should bear in mind that the “true” 
party doctrine could be more extremist than communicated officially. To prevent this, a 
mix of different party literature is used. 
 
The analysed empirical material is therefore (for culture relevant) section(s) in the 
cases’ latest party program, section(s) in the cases’ latest budget proposal and, 
parliamentary motions (beslutningsforslag/propositions de loi/motioner) presented in 
Kulturudvalget/La Commission des Affaires Culturelles et de l’Éducation/  
Kulturutskottet by the cases during the last two years. The party programmes are 
expected to generate an overarching and general picture of ideas on cultural policy, and 
should thus (compared to other documents) be more representative for party ideology.
151
 
A less abstract picture should be reflected in budget proposals and party motions, as 
these are connected to more practical policy outcomes. What sections that are “for 
culture relevant”, are moreover based upon what DF, FN and SD themselves include in 
the concept. Even if that imply that somewhat different political areas are included, this 
should not be a problem as the parties’ ideas (and not their policies per se) are in 
focus.
152
 
  
The quantity and quality of the described material vary between the parties. To prevent 
that from affecting the analysis credibility, complementing relevant material was used in 
cases when not judged as thick enough. This highlights the importance of design 
flexibility.
153
 The material used in the analysis therefore varies to some extent between 
the parties. While SD’s material was judged as thick without complementation, DF’s 
were complemented with their principle program (Principprogram) and with a 
description of cultural policy on their homepage.
154
 FN provided the sparsest material. 
As they did not present any parliamentary motions on cultural policy during the last 
years, such material were replaced with formally asked questions concerning cultural 
policy. Moreover, questions from FN’s deputes in the senate were also included. To 
confirm that the analysed material gave a correct reflection of the cases’ ideas, other 
material (such as older parliamentary questions, articles and blog posts by central 
actors) was gone through more superficially.  
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6.5. Processing empirical material 
Marshall and Rossman (2011) state that “qualitative data analysis is a search for general 
statements about relationships and underlying themes”.155 In this thesis, this implies a 
search for statements that illuminates PRRPs’ ideas when it comes to range and 
objectives of cultural policy. To recognize what parts of the empirical material that can 
be used as indicators for such ideas, the ideas should be transformed/operationalized 
into operational indicators.156 Here, ideas on range and objectives of cultural policy are 
operationalized into two analytical instruments (see next two chapters for instruments 
and categories). While the first is used to identify range regarding importance and 
understanding of cultural policy, the second identify cultural policy objectives. As both 
instruments consist of a set of pre-established categories, the analytic process is 
deductive.  
 
Units from the empirical material was coded and placed into the categories. Sections 
from longer texts,
157
 budgetary areas, and parliamentary motions/questions were 
analysed as one unit each. 
158
 Units from party programs were valued as most important 
when placing the parties in the analytical instruments, as seen as the most central 
document for the party to communicate its message.
159
 One unit could be coded into 
more than one category. 
When coding, it is important to recognize that scholars are never free from own 
opinions.160 Besides actively working with preventing potential biases, it is therefore 
important to choose a suiting method for coding. To code units according to the 
instruments’ categories, the causal chain approach was used. In each section of 
reasoning/unit in the studied empirical documents, cultural policy objectives were 
identified based on the argumentation or reasoning used to legitimize it. In other words, 
symptoms of the larger objectives (if not written out explicitly) were identified that 
could be traced back to their source.161 This can be illustrated with a unit from SD’s 
party program. 
 
The cultural heritage has an intrinsic value, for instance by the aesthetic value that it 
represents. To safeguard the cultural heritage is also to show respect towards previous 
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generations and to remember what they have accomplished. However, its most important 
aspect is that the cultural heritage creates unification. Every society needs shared norms and 
values, collective memories, common myths, common festivities and traditions, common 
manners and customs in order to keep together.162  
  
Here, the central objectivity of cultural policy is clearly to protect Swedish cultural 
heritage (coded in the instruments as anthropological – geographical/temporal 
dimension – national/traditional objectives). This is based on how SD legitimizes their 
focus on cultural heritage with argumentations about its intrinsic and aesthetic value 
and its ability to create unification and monitor respect towards previous generations.  
 
The analysis came to an end when enough material had been analyzed for it to be 
reliable (i.e. to speak for itself).163 If reflecting that the three cases are similar despite 
their internal differences, this indicates that DF, FN and SD are unified based on 
something stronger – in this case their supposedly shared nativism.  
 
 
6.5.1. Range of cultural policy 
The first instrument was 
developed to identify 
range when it comes to 
cultural policy importance 
and understanding (see 
Figure 6.5.1:1). Cultural 
policy importance was 
operationalized into the 
categories “higher” and 
“lower” importance. 
Besides using the causal 
chain approach, a party’s 
interest was assessed based on it’s parliamentary activity and budget proposal. If 
proposing an increase of the cultural policy budget compared to the national budget, this 
was taken as an indication of higher importance. Understanding of cultural policy was 
operationalized into the categories ”aesthetical” and “anthropological” culture  
(indicators identified in chapter 4.1).  
 
Based on theory, PRRPs are expected to be placed in the category “higher importance”, 
as cultural policy should be one of the main political instruments for PRRPs to reach 
nativist ideological objectives (see Figure 1:1). Further on, they are expected to be 
placed in the category “anthropological” cultural understanding, as what should be 
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 Figure 6.5.1:1. Analytical instrument used to reflect political parties 
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protected according to nativism is culture in its more anthropological sense. 
Furthermore, in contrast to aesthetical culture, anthropological culture refers to a 
plurality of cultures (one for every society) and thus also to cultural differences between 
rather than within societies. 164  Besides reflecting the nativist rhetoric of PRRPs 
explained in chapter 3.3., these expectations are further strengthen by previous research 
(see chapter 5). 
 
6.5.2. Objective of cultural policy  
The second analytical instrument was developed to identify objectives in cultural policy 
based on the typology of cultural conflict lines explained in chapter 4.2. According to 
the instrument, objectives in cultural policy were operationalized into 14 categories 
where a party can be placed in either the category “high culture” or “popular culture” on 
the class-related dimension, in “international culture”, “national culture” or “regional 
culture” on the geographical dimension, and in “traditional culture” or “innovative 
culture” on the temporal dimension. The categories are repeated to represent both an 
aesthetical and anthropological understanding of cultural policy (see Figure 6.5.2:1). 
 
 
By using the causal chain approach, the results of the coding are to be placed in the 
instrument. Here, one conflicting camp in each dimension is chosen for each party. For 
example, if the indication from the previous example (chapter 6.5.) is reflected in all 
documents, an “x” is placed in the second last box in the “SD-column”. This implies 
that SD prioritizes “traditional culture” over “innovatory culture” on the temporal 
dimension when it comes to anthropological cultural expressions. Further on, an “X” is 
used to signalize the category assessed as being the most important for each party.  
 
                                                          
164
 Harding (2007) p. 10; Miller and Yúdice (2002) p. 1; Åhlberg (1995) p. 169-70 
  Aesthetical  Anthropological 
Dimension Conflict line DFP FN SD DFP FN SD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Class-related High culture       
Popular culture        
 
Geographical  
International culture       
National culture       
Regional culture       
 
 
 
 
 
 
Temporal Traditional culture       
Innovatory culture       
Note: Categories based on cultural conflict lines identified by Mangset (1992). See chapter 4.2. 
 Figure 6.5.2:1. Analytical instrument used to reflect political parties objectives of cultural policy 
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As previously explained, the PRRPs are (based on theory) expected to prioritize 
anthropological cultural objectives. Further on, they are expected to prioritize national 
and traditional cultural objectives based on their nationally centered and conservative 
nativist core. The expectation about national cultural objectives is further strengthen by 
(sparse) previous research. However, previous research remains unclear regarding 
objectives on the temporal- and class-related dimension (see chapter 5). So is theory 
concerning the class-related dimension. However, based on nativism, parties could be 
expected to focus on cultural characteristic for their country. For example, FN could be 
expected to focus on high culture based on France’s high cultural heritage. This 
dimension could however originate a conflict, as the populism of PRRPs states that 
politics should be designed according to the general will of the people (i.e. popular 
culture).165  
 
 
6.6. Delimitations  
 
Before accounting for the analyzed material, the reader should be aware of the thesis’ 
delimitations. First, in analyzing DF, FN and DF, only Western European PRRPs are 
included. That is, even if the results are expected to be somewhat generalizable for 
PRRPs, this is not necessarily true for Eastern European PRRPs or for PRRPs outside of 
Europe. Second, in analyzing official party material, parties are taken at their word. 
Even if, as discussed in chapter 6.4., this should be less of a problem than sometimes 
argued and measures are taken to prevent this, the reader should bear in mind that the 
“true” party doctrine could be more extremist than communicated officially. Moreover, 
in focusing on the core ideological characteristic of PRRPs – nativism – , the thesis 
disregards other characteristics that these parties are said to share (se chapter 3.3). 
Finally, it also disregards parts of cultural policy which are normally central in cultural 
policy research, such as organisation and state intervention. However, such issues are 
not relevant concerning what cultural expressions PRRP’s want to protect with their 
cultural policy. 
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7. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
 
7.1. Range of cultural policy: cultural importance  
 
As explained in chapter 1.1 and 4.5.1., DF, FN and SD are expected to attribute a higher 
importance to cultural policy, as it is considered to be a main instrument for PRRPs to 
reach nativist objectives. 
 
In line with the expectations, central party documents reflect that DF assigns a higher 
importance to cultural policy. In their party manifesto and in their principle program, 
DF communicates that “Protection and development of this [Danish] culture is a 
prerequisite for the country's survival as a free and enlightened society”.166 Further on, 
DF’s interest in cultural policy is reflected in their proposal to increase its budget with 
7%, compared to the government’s (social democrats and leftists).167 Such increase does 
however not seem to satisfy DF’s interest, as they additionally want most possible 
cultural activities to be financed by advertisements and sponsorships.
168
 DF’s interest in 
cultural policy is further confirmed by their parliamentary activity. Between 2014 and 
2015, DF presented 43.8 % (or seven motions) of all parties’ parliamentary motions and 
legislative proposals in The Cultural Affairs Committee.
169
 
 
SD expresses that culture is central for society, national identity and the individual. 
Therefore, SD considers cultural policy to be an important area for the State. 
 
Culture is not only a central building block in our society and national identity, it is also a 
valuable component of each individual’s life. To create and take part in cultural experiences 
contribute to the personal development and enhance the quality of life [...] The Sweden 
Democrats’ view is that the State has a heavy responsibility in terms of the creation of good 
prerequisites for a vibrant cultural life and to ensure a good infrastructure for cultural 
workers”.170 
 
Such interest is reflected in SD’s proposition to increase the budget for Culture, media, 
religious communities and leisure with 3.06 % compared to government’s budget 
(social democrats and greens).
171
 Their interest is also reflected in their high activity in 
the parliamentary Committee on Cultural Affairs, where SD has presented 21.3 % (or 
27) of all parliamentary motions presented by Swedish parties between 2014 and 
                                                          
166
 Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 112, Dansk Folkeparti (2002) p. III.  
167
 Dansk Folkeparti (2015); Finansministeriet (2015)  
168
 Dansk Folkeparti (a)  
169
 Information from Folketinget (2015). To also include initiatives put forward by governing parties, 
legislative proposals are included.  
170
 2014/15:2895 p. 4-5 
171
 2014/15:SD100 p. 105 
34 
 
2015.
172
 When it comes to importance of cultural policy, SD (as DF) clearly follows the 
expectations in attaching a higher importance to the area. 
 
FN’s position is more contradictory. In their party program, FN follows the expectations 
of PRRPs by stating that culture is more important in France than elsewhere.   
The art and language form an essential dimension of our identity. More than in other 
nations, Culture is inseparable from the history and radiance of France. France is an old 
human territory, heir to many of the greatest civilizations known to history [...] All 
authentic national politics should support this major asset, value it, keep an ambition that is 
at the height of this French exception.
173
 
The practical substance behind these phrases is however doubtful. Besides claiming that 
“[t]he Ministry of Cultural Affairs has been relatively pampered by the rightist and 
leftist governments”,174 Marine Le Pen wants to reduce the cultural policy budget with 
383 million EUR (2015).
175
 Even if hardly noticeable compared to the generous national 
budget,
176
 such reduction is an important statement. That FN is assessed to have a lower 
interest in cultural policy is further confirmed by their zero parliamentary motions 
presented in the National Assembly and Senate between 2014 and 2015. Other activity 
(i.e. asked questions) confirms the pattern as only nine questions can be linked to 
cultural policy.
177
 In contrast to DF and SD, FN does thus not follow the expectations of 
PRRPs.  
Taken together, SD and DF communicate a stronger interest in cultural policy, while 
the opposite is true for FN. Put differently, FN’s interest is more similar to other 
political parties in general,
178
 while SD’s and DF’s are in line with what could be 
expected from PRRP’s based on their nativist ideological core. 
 
 
7. 2. Range of cultural policy: understanding of 
culture  
 
As explained in chapter 6.5.1., DF, FN and SD are expected have an anthropological 
understanding of culture while culture in its anthropological sense is what should be 
protected according to nativism. 
 
Indeed, in line with the expectations, DF’s anthropological cultural understanding is 
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clearly communicated in their statement that Danish culture “consists of the sum of the 
Danish people’s values, beliefs, religion, language, customs, attitudes and traditions”. 
Even if not mentioning art, DF’s central documents demonstrates that also aesthetical 
culture is important to DF (further developed in chapter 7.3;7.4 and 7.5., where it is also 
communicated that DF emphasises aesthetical objectives to a greater extent than SD). 
 
The first phrases in SD’s party manifesto’s cultural section explicitly state that they 
follow the expectations of PRRPs by their broad anthropological understanding of 
culture. “Culture is an ambiguous concept, but is primarily used in the sense of mental 
cultivation or socially transmitted lifestyles. We claim that especially the latter of these 
meanings have a completely central political function”. 179  Their anthropological 
understanding is further demonstrated when SD accounts for how they define culture. 
 
Culture may be defined as the lifestyle that unites a community or a certain group of 
people. As such, it includes languages, behavioural patterns, customs and festivities, 
institutions, art and music, dress codes, religion, rituals, games, values, norms concerning 
laws and moral systems, etc [...] In its broadest sense, the Swedish culture could be defined 
as the sum of everything that has ever been thought, written, said, created or made by 
persons belonging to the Swedish nation. 180 
Indeed, in line with how anthropological culture is explained in chapter 4.1, SD’s 
definition includes the Swedish society’s whole way of life. This cultural understanding 
is reflected in all studied documents. While cultural expressions such as heritage, 
language, religion and sports recur, expressions attached to the more aesthetical 
understanding remains rare. For example, theatre (an usually important feature in 
cultural policy) is not mentioned except as an area of expenditure in SD’s budget.181 
 
As the case regarding cultural importance, FN deviates from the pattern of DF and SD 
as well as from expectations of PRRPs. Even if language seems important for FN, they 
have a clear focus on aesthetical cultural expressions throughout the political 
documents. The opening phrase in FN’s party program’s cultural section reflects this in 
stating that “[t]he art and language form an essential dimension of our identity”.182 Even 
though language represents an anthropological understanding of culture, the totality of 
studied documents communicates a focus on aesthetical culture. Even if not presenting 
an explicit definition of culture as DF and SD, they are therefore assessed to have a 
more traditional and narrow aesthetical understanding of culture. That is, FN’s cultural 
understanding is rather in line with general parties’ cultural policy than what is expected 
from PRRP’s.183   
 
Taken together, DF and SD follow what is expected from PRRPs while FN deviates 
from the pattern. While DF and SD are assessed to have an anthropological 
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understanding of culture and cultural policy, FN is assessed to have an aesthetical 
understanding of cultural policy.    
 
7.3. Objectives of cultural policy: the geographical 
dimension 
 
As explained in chapter 6.5.2., DF, FN and SD are expected to prioritize anthropological 
cultural objectives in all dimensions. On the geographical dimension, they are expected 
to prioritize national cultural objectives based on their nationally centered nativist core. 
Indeed, the empirical material clearly communicates that the geographical dimension is 
central for all parties. Again in line with the expectations, all parties focus on the 
protection of one’s own national culture while being hostile towards foreign cultures. 
 
DF demonstrates their national focus by stating that “[t]he Danish culture is under 
pressure from several perspectives. Therefore, the Danish People’s party asks for broad 
political initiatives to strengthen the Danishness [danskheden] in all our cultural 
institutions”. 184  The importance of national focus is underlined with the statement 
“[p]rotection and development of this [Danish] culture is a prerequisite for the country's 
survival as a free and enlightened society”.185 That immigration of cultures and religions 
is threatening Danish culture is developed in the following section.  
 
Danish People's Party favour cultural cooperation with other countries, but we are opposed 
to giving cultures, which are based on completely different values than ours, influence in 
Denmark. The way of life we have chosen in Denmark, is unique. It is conditioned by our 
culture, and can in a small country like ours not survive, if we allow mass immigration of 
foreign religions and cultures. A multicultural society is a society without internal 
coherence and unity, which is why the world's multicultural societies are characterized by a 
lack of solidarity and often also open conflict. There is no reason to assume that Denmark 
can avoid sharing the fate of other multicultural societies if we let foreign cultures get 
decisive influence.
186  
 
Their hostility towards foreign cultures are also expressed in their principle program, 
where DF states that “Denmark is not, and has never been, a country of immigration. 
Therefore, we will not accept a multi-ethnic transformation of the country”.187  Thus, 
following the expectations of PRRPs, DF clearly show that they want to protect Danish 
culture and the “Danishness” which they claim is threatened by the multicultural 
society. Especially, DF wants to protect such Danishness by focusing on anthropological 
cultural expressions like the Danish language and Danish cultural heritage such as 
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historical buildings and rune stones. 188  When it comes to aesthetical culture, DF’s 
national focus is expressed by their support for Danish speaking pieces, Danish art work 
and Danish artists in general. For example, DF writes that “Danish film- and theatre 
productions should primarily get support when Danish is the dominating language in the 
production and when it uses a majority on Danish actors”.189 
 
As DF and in line with the expectations, SD primarily focuses on preserving Swedish 
culture, said to consist of characteristics such as phenomena typical for Swedish society 
and history. 
 
What we primarily focus on preserving is, however, things that we regard as the core of 
Swedish culture. To this core, we primarily consider those phenomena that have especially 
characterized the development of our society, are deeply rooted in Swedish history, are 
widespread among former and/or current Swedes, have a strong symbolic significance for 
Swedish identity or are unique to the Swedish nation or a certain part of the Swedish 
nation.
190  
 
As previously recognized, this reflects a anthropological view on cultural policy. More 
specifically, SD emphasises the preservation of Swedish cultural heritage for which 
(among other things) Christianity is seen as especially important. 
 
Sweden has been a Christian country for a thousand years. No other idea and institution has 
been as important for the formation of Swedish culture that has Christianity and the 
Swedish church. The preservation of the Christian heritage is therefore a concern of all 
Swedes, believers and non-believers. The ecclesiastical cultural heritage also represents the 
largest single part of the material Swedish cultural heritage.191 
 
Other prioritized parts of Swedish heritage are the Swedish language, heritage sites, 
cultural landscapes, historical buildings and ships. 192  Their national focus is also 
reflected in (their few) aesthetical initiatives, such as their proposal to introduce a 
Swedish cultural canon.193 It should also be recognized that SD, in contrast to DF and 
FN, expresses some concerns regarding regional cultural objectives. Even if SD 
highlights their national focus in trying to prevent the disappearance of Swedish village-
names (in favour for names in local languages),194 they propose actions to preserve 
minority languages and heritage – especially concerning the Sami, Finnish-Swedes, 
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Estonian-Swedes and the blind (i.e. Braille).195 
 
Also the “protection from” aspect of nativism is clearly reflected in SD’s cultural 
policy, as they state that “the Sweden Democrat’s view on culture and its importance for 
the survival for our society and nation evidently implicates that we are strong opponents 
of the political idea of multiculturalism”.196 Instead of multiculturalism, SD advocates 
assimilation. 
 
Our alternative to multiculturalism is a return to an assimilation policy that creates unity, 
similar to what existed in the country until 1975, where the objective is that immigrants 
should adapt to local customs and eventually abandon their original cultures and identities 
to, instead, become part of the Swedish nation. The core of assimilation is to establish that 
the Swedish State is not a cultural vacuum, and that the Swedish nation's culture by virtue 
of its history, with the sole exception of the national minorities, is superior to other nations' 
cultures within the Swedish State. As a logical consequence of this, all state and municipal 
support aiming to maintain and enforce immigrants’ original cultures and identities should 
be withdrawn. In parallel with this, support for the preservation and maintenance of the 
Swedish cultural heritage should increase.197 
 
Except withdrawing support to immigrants’ original cultures and identities, a further 
practical example is SD’s proposal to minimize international cultural exchange and 
cooperation.198 
 
DF’s and SD’s focus on the nation does not, however, prevent them from expressing 
that Swedish and Danish culture are parts of a larger Nordic cultural community, which 
is a part of the western world. DF states that, 
 
Denmark's long cultural development has been greatly influenced by its connection with the 
world outside Denmark, mainly the Nordic countries, Germany, France, England and the 
United States. This cultural influence have not extinguished our genuine culture due to the 
fact that we, regardless of our country's small size, have had the ability and possibility to let 
the influence take place on our terms and to reshape the external influence according to our 
standards.199 
 
SD further explains how the familiarity between the Nordic countries and the Western 
world has originated.    
 
The deepest root of the originality of Swedish culture lies in our history and in the nature 
and the climate in which it has emerged. Against this background it is not surprising that 
our culture is very similar to our Nordic neighbours’. Through the similarities in living 
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conditions and millennia of close and natural relationships between peoples, a Scandinavian 
and Nordic cultural community has emerged. This Nordic cultural community is something 
that the Sweden Democrats want to embrace and develop. In a wider context, we also see 
Sweden as part of a North-European, European and Western cultural community.200 
 
On a more specific political level, this is reflected in SD proposals to investment in a 
new Nordic house and in education to strengthen the comprehension of Nordic 
languages.201 A culture underlined to be especially different and incompatible with the 
Swedish and Danish cultures are Islam. 
 
Islam and in particular its strong political and fundamentalist branch is, according to the Sweden 
Democrats, that religious belief proved to have the largest difficulties to harmoniously coexist with 
the Swedish and Western culture. The influence of Islam on Swedish society should therefore in 
the largest possible extent be counteracted and immigration from Muslim countries with strong 
elements of fundamentalism should be strictly limited.202 
 
Even if having more of an aesthetical cultural focus, FN’s cultural policy resembles 
SD’s and DF’s and meets the expectations for PRRPs in its aim to protect what is 
French while considering outside cultural elements as a threat. As noted, FN writes in 
their manifesto that “[m]ore than in other nations, Culture is inseparable from the 
history and radiance of France. France is an old human territory, heir to many of the 
greatest civilizations known to history [...] All authentic national politics should support 
this major asset, value it, keep an ambition that is at the height of this French 
exception”.203 Like DF, FN specifies the national aesthetical focus by expressing that 
French artists, art work/pieces and art industry should be prioritized. For example, FN 
writes that, “[d]evices promoting our cultural exception (quotas when broadcasting 
French works, special support to the French industry etc.) are part of a logic of national 
priority, where the cultural exception is nothing else but a national priority applied to 
culture”.204   
 
Concerning anthropological cultural expressions FN focus on language, both within and 
outside of French borders. In an international perspective, they want French to reclaim 
its position of a world language. For examples, the FN deputy Marion Maréchal-Le Pen 
states that,  
 
While the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Culture whiteness, in the media, of their 
common will to develop a real cultural diplomacy, the French language must be one of its 
main instruments. Vector of a people, a culture and a way of thinking, this language was, 
until the Treaty of Versailles 1919, the language of international diplomacy.
205
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Indeed, FN notes that the French language is threatened by the increasing use of English 
globally and of anglicisms nationally. Another considered threat is the use of different 
teaching languages in school (such as Arabic and Romani).206 In general, FN writes that 
“The French cultural exception and our language are threatened by globalization. A true 
national policy must revive the excellence and originality of the French cultural creation 
and its worldwide diffusion in cooperation with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Cooperation and Francophonie”.207  
 
Taken together, the parties’ national focus follows what is expected from PRRPs, as 
characterized by their aim to protect national culture from the culture of others. 
However, while the main focus of FN is on national aesthetical culture, the focus of DF 
and SD is on national anthropological culture. 
 
 
7.4. Objectives of cultural policy: the temporal 
dimension  
 
As explained in chapter 6.5.2., DF, FN and SD are expected to prioritize anthropological 
cultural objectives in all dimensions. On the temporal dimension, they are expected to 
prioritize traditional cultural objectives based on their conservative nativist core. This 
expectation is reflected by all parties, and is particularly prominent regarding cultural 
heritage.  
 
DF empathize traditional culture in highlighting that “a particularly important task is to 
preserve old historical buildings, art values and the like of the national heritage”.208 
Indeed, a large focus of DF is on research and on the preservation of historical buildings 
and environments, such as the manor house museum Gammel Esterup.209 Other focuses 
is on the Danish language (said to have been “vulgarized”) and to preserve the 
constitutional monarchy.210 When it comes to more aesthetical objectives, they focus on 
education in traditional Danish music and cultural history, the preservation of historical 
architecture and the presence of classical cultural expressions in the media.211 However, 
DF somewhat depart from the expected conservatism by also emphasizing more 
aesthetical innovative culture. For instance, DF states that “an important objective of 
cultural policy to give room and space to the creation of Danish art at a level which may 
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represent Danish culture and contribute to the discussion of central issues in our 
time”.212 For example, DF promotes modern architecture and literature.213 Even if so, 
nearly all DF’s parliamentary motions concerns traditional culture. Therefore, DF’s 
temporal focus is assessed to be traditional.  
 
Following the expectations, FN focuses on traditional culture in general and on cultural 
heritage in particular. FN’s criticism of the current government for neglecting historical 
monuments, literature, theatre and music reflect this.214In contrast to current French 
policy, FN states that “[o]nce again, defending the heritage will be given highest 
priority".215 Further on, besides focusing on the earlier mentioned aesthetical heritage of 
literature, theatre and music, they also emphasise the preservation of more 
anthropological historical monuments and venues.216 
 
Of the three parties, SD reflects the greatest empathy on traditional cultural objectives - 
especially concerning anthropological cultural expressions. Meanwhile, they express an 
almost hostile attitude towards innovative culture. In SD’s budget’s cultural section, the 
largest part is dedicated to the protection and vitalisation of Swedish cultural heritage.217 
SD explains the importance of cultural heritage in terms of its intrinsic value and 
unifying capacity.  
 
The cultural heritage has an intrinsic value, for instance by the aesthetic value that it 
represents. To safeguard the cultural heritage is also to show respect towards previous 
generations and to remember what they have accomplished. However, its most important 
aspect is that the cultural heritage creates unification. Every society needs shared norms and 
values, collective memories, common myths, common festivities and traditions, common 
manners and customs in order to keep together.218   
 
More specifically, SD writes that “[w]e increase the founding to preserve, foster, 
animate and spread knowledge about ancient monuments, cultural landscapes and 
buildings”.219 As mentioned, SD focuses on anthropological traditional cultural heritage 
such as Christianity, traditional folklore, historically important heritage sights, buildings 
and ships.
220
 Less focus is on traditional aesthetical cultural objectives. SD does 
however wish to develop a Swedish cultural canon and further support the production of 
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films monitoring Swedish history.
221
 As mentioned, SD seems less eager to support 
contemporary and innovative culture. SD wants to “promote a high degree of 
independence within contemporary culture”.222  Put differently, SD wants to heavily 
reduce founding for contemporary artists and for museums monitoring modern art.
223
 
 
Summarized, the temporal dimension is assessed to be important for all cases. More 
specifically, in line with what could be expected from PRRPs, traditional culture is 
prioritized over innovative culture both regarding aesthetical and anthropological 
cultural understanding. However, while SDs focus on traditional culture is rather 
radical, DF and FN have more moderate positions. Further on, while DF’s and SD’s 
objectives are more anthropological, FN’s are more aesthetical. 
 
 
7.5. Objectives of cultural policy: the class-related 
dimension  
 
As explained in chapter 6.5.2., a potential conflict could be expected to occur regarding 
objectives on the class-related dimension. At the one hand, FN could be expected to 
prioritize high culture based on France’s high cultural heritage. As Denmark and 
Sweden are not characterized by their high cultural heritage, this must not be true for 
DF and SD. On the other hand, PRRPs are (in being populist) expected to prioritize 
popular cultural expressions as politics should be designed according to the general will 
of the people.224 As expected, the class-related dimension is where the parties display 
most differences.  
 
Even if the two earlier dimensions are assessed to be of stronger interest for SD, they 
also empathises anthropological popular culture. Summarized together with their other 
objectives, SD wish to further support “the preservation of the cultural heritage and to 
animate the traditional, popular, Swedish culture”.225 SD’s focus on popular culture is 
further highlighted when explaining that one of the cores of Swedish culture is culture 
that is “widespread among former and/or current Swedes”.226  
 
Connected to the popular aspect of culture, SD underlines the importance of 
accessibility in stating that “[c]ulture should be viable and for all. The guiding 
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principles for our policy in the area is accessibility and public health”.227 For instance, 
SD proposes large investments in education in the arts, that cultural institutions should 
be less focused on larger cities, and to strengthen the cultural accessibility for children, 
elderly and disabled. 228  Further on, in line with populism, culture that gets public 
funding should (to a greater extent) be cultural expressions preferred by the people. For 
example,  
 
One way to move the influence of contemporary culture closer to the citizens is to introduce 
a system where every resident is assigned a cultural allowance, a grant reserved for cultural 
consumption. In practical terms, this contribution could be designed like the grant for dental 
care, where museums, ateliers, concert halls and other venues that offer cultural 
consumption is connected to a system and that every citizen is annually awarded a pot that 
can be used when visiting the affiliated cultural arenas. In this way, support is given to 
cultural industries and contemporary culture without being controlled by forces other than 
the preferences of the people.229 
 
To be more specific, SD’s main focus considering anthropological popular cultural 
expressions is on sports, language and on museums monitoring Sweden’s popular 
cultural heritage. 230  SD’s large support of sports is legitimized with the (populist) 
argumentation: “[s]ports and outdoor recreation is a large movement in Sweden, often 
with great popular support while large parts are non-profit. The work and interest in 
sport and outdoor activities is also elemental for movement and public health, especially 
among children and young people”.231 SD also proposes investments in more aesthetical 
popular culture such as traditional Swedish handcraft, folk art and folk music.232 High 
cultural objectives only have a minor role in the studied SD documents, even if SD wish 
to develop a cultural cannon, provide qualitative education in the arts, promote the 
preservation and exhibition of historically important ships.233 Indeed, the objectives of 
high culture seem weak, as SD wish to reduce the budget both for current artists and 
literature.234 Moreover, the quite high culturally charged theatre is only mentioned when 
they propose increased founding to the more popular Riksteatern.235  
 
In contrast, DF is assessed to focus on high cultural objectives. In their manifesto, DF 
writes that an important aim for cultural policy is to support culture at a level 
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representative for Danish culture.236  To achieve this, they propose a council of art 
experts to be installed to support professional artists without large commercial income 
and to ensure the production of qualitative culture. 
 
The Danish People's Party wants the economic and artistic responsibility for the support 
provided to the professional art, to be left to a council composed of persons with first-hand 
insight to art and culture. [...] The financial support is used primarily to ensure the 
production of artistic works of high quality to the Danish society. Danish People's Party 
emphasizes that support for individual artists should depend on their other income so that 
there is no support for artists with large commercial income.237 
 
Further on, they want to support the production and meditation of high cultural 
expressions such as museums, theatres and orchestras, and to ensure the quality of 
cultural educations in areas such as architecture, film, fine arts and theatre.238 Even if 
emphasizing aesthetical high cultural expressions, DF also considers more 
anthropological culture such as the protection of castles, manors and the Danish 
monarchy. 239  When it comes to more popular cultural objectives, DF (as SD) 
emphasizes cultural accessibility and that the Danish’ people themselves should, to a 
greater extent, decide which cultural expressions that should be supported.240  More 
explicit policy examples are focused on the Danish language, general history and 
traditional music.241  
 
FN seems moderately interested of the class-related dimension and their objectives are 
complex. At first glance, FN seems highly culturally elitist with phrases such as “[m]ore 
than in other nations, Culture is inseparable from the history and radiance of France. 
France is an old human territory, heir to many of the greatest civilizations known to 
history” and that cultural policy should “keep an ambition that is at the height of this 
French exception”.242 Such impression is further strengthened by their aesthetical focus 
on high cultural expressions such as historical monuments, architecture, literature, 
theatre and opera. 243  However, popular objectives are reflected in their focus on 
accessibility and that cultural support should, to a greater extent, be attributed to culture 
chosen by the French people themselves. This is reflected in several places, such as in 
their claim that “our cultural life do too often suffer from opacity and clientelism, 
without sufficiently listen to the tastes and expectations of our people”244 and that “The 
budget of the Ministry of Culture focuses too much on Paris, and its sterile productions 
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compared to the province; this condition must change. The practices of amateurs should 
be better cared of”. 245  The theme of accessibility returns regarding more specific 
objectives of popular anthropological culture, such as increased access to historical 
venues and regional radio. 246  FN also proposes investments in other popular 
anthropological cultural expressions such as the theme park Parc Puy du Fou – a 
popular tourist destination.247 However, FN’s focus regarding anthropological popular 
culture is on the French language, which is described as “structuring the collective 
culture” and for immigrants as “the ultimate substrate for assimilation into the national 
community” and for “learning of [French] citizenchip”. 248  Taken together, FN is 
assessed to emphasize high aesthetical culture but popular anthropological culture. 
 
Summarized, the class-related dimension gets least attention from all cases compared to 
other dimensions. While SD shows clear preferences for popular culture, DF’s 
objectives are oriented towards high culture. FN objectives are divided, as they display 
high cultural aesthetical objectives in parallel with popular anthropological cultural 
objectives. Possibly, the differences between PRRPs could be seen as indication of the 
previously explained potential conflict between nativist and populist ideology. 
Especially regarding FN where nativism could be expected to generate high cultural 
objectives based on their high cultural heritage, while populism could be expected to 
generate popular cultural objectives to meet the general will of the people.249 However, 
this does not explain DFs high cultural objectives, as Denmark is not as France 
characterized by its high cultural heritage. 
 
 
7.6. Range and objectives of cultural policy: 
summary and comparison 
 
Figure 7.6:1 shows DF’s, FN’s and SD’s objectives (here as stances on the cultural 
conflict lines) in cultural policy. 
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Note: “x” implicates the cultural objectives of parties regarding conflicting cultural camps. “X” signalizes 
the parties most important objective.  
 
 
Figure 7.6:1 DF’s, FN’s and SD’s objectives of cultural policy regarding aesthetical and anthropological 
understanding of culture 
 
 
The figure displays that FN, SD and DF’s objectives with cultural policy largely 
corresponds to the same pattern. The objectives are most extensive on the geographical 
dimension where all parties focus on national culture. As described in chapter 4.2, such 
national priority is closely connected to aims of a homogeneous national culture and a 
distinctive national identity.
250
 The parties’ objectives are also important regarding 
traditional culture on the temporal dimension. Less importance is attributed to 
objectives on the class-related dimension, where DF focuses on high culture, SD on 
popular culture, and FN on both (aesthetical high culture and anthropological popular 
culture). In other words, the pattern largely corresponds to what is expected from parties 
with a nativist ideology which strengthen previous research’ identification of nativism 
as core ideology for PRRPs. Even if interesting, DF’s, FN’s and SD’s differences in the 
class-related dimension is less important for this conclusion, as this seems to be the least 
interesting area for the parties. Further on, nativism provides a possible explanation in 
the cases of FN and SD as their differences could originate from divergent national 
contexts. 
However, DF’s, FN’s and 
SD’s range of cultural 
policy is more complex. 
As communicated in figure 
7.6:2, SD and DF are 
assessed to attach a higher 
importance and have an 
anthropological 
understanding of cultural 
policy. That position is in 
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Figure 7.6:2 DF’s, FN’s and SD’s range of cultural policy regarding 
understanding and importance 
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line with what is expected from PRRP’s based on their nativist core ideology. However, 
the opposite is true for FN. FN is assessed to attach a lower importance and have an 
aesthetical understanding of cultural policy which does not reflect the expectations. 
Indeed, FN’s range of cultural policy is more similar to political parties in general,251 
while SD’s and DF’s position is in line with what is expected from PRRP’s. 
 
Previous research confirms that DF, FN and SD meet the “protection from” part of 
nativism by their hostile immigration policy.
252
 Taken together, DF’s and SD’s range 
and objective of cultural policy confirms that these parties also meet the “protection of” 
part of nativism. However, the same is not true for FN. Even if FN’s objectives are in 
line with those of nativism, their lower interest and aesthetical understanding of the area 
communicates that they do not consider cultural policy to be a main political instrument 
to reach nativist objectives. Therefore, FN cannot be said to meet the “protection of” 
part of nativism on more than the (previously confirmed) rhetorical level. 
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8. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Previous research claim that nativism is the core ideological characteristic for the so 
called PRRP family.253 Here, I have argued that two political instruments should be of 
particular interest for political actors to reach nativist objectives. While the literature 
confirms that immigration policy (i.e the “protection from” part of nativism) is a core 
political characteristic of PRRPs,254 the “protection of” part of nativism - cultural policy 
- remains understudied. To make research on the PRRP family more comprehensive, I 
have therefore questioned what the positioning of PRRPs regarding importance, 
cultural range and objectives of cultural policy makes for the appropriateness in calling 
them a family. 
 
When comparing cultural policy objectives of DF, FN and SD, they all correspond to the 
expectations of PRRPs. That is, they empathises national cultural objectives over 
regional, while being hostile towards international culture on the geographical 
dimension. On the temporal dimension, they empathise traditional cultural objectives 
over innovative. As the expectations of PRRPs are less evident regarding the class-
related dimension, the somewhat different objectives of DF, FN and SD are considered 
as less important. 
 
The compared parties are less similar when it comes to range of cultural policy. DF and 
SD correspond to the expectations of PRRPs in attributing a higher importance and 
anthropological understanding to cultural policy. Taken together, their objectives and 
range of cultural policy therefore meet the “protection of” part of nativism. However, 
FN attributes a lower importance and aesthetical understanding to cultural policy, 
which communicates that they do not regard cultural policy as a main political 
instrument to reach nativist objectives. In other words, even if corresponding to the 
expectations of PRRPs regarding objectives of cultural policy, FN do not meet the 
“protection of” part of nativism on more than the rhetorical level. 
 
That FN deviates from the expected pattern is serious for the so called party family of 
PRRPs. Besides considered to be the founder of PRRPs’ ethnopluralistic approach (i.e. 
exclusion based on culture), FN is often described as the prototype of PRRPs. 255 
Therefore, more PRRPs could be expected to have cultural policy ideas in line with 
those of FN. Especially as this study’s results should be somewhat generalizable for all 
Western European PRRPs based on the very different cases. Still, the results in this 
thesis do not change that PRRPs could be considered to be a (somewhat loosely 
connected) family based on their shared nativist rhetoric. However, the results 
communicate that the family should be divided in subgroups, whereof one branch 
underpins their nativist rhetoric with political substance (i.e. DF and SD) while the other 
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does not (i.e. FN).  
 
The so called party family of PRRPs can however be further problematized. In previous 
literature, PRRPs are lumped together based on the party family criteria policy and 
ideology (i.e. nativism and immigration policy).256 However, PRRPs do not meet other 
criteria used in party family research such as origins and sociology, transnational 
federations and name.257 Indeed, if PRRPs (as communicated here) can only be lumped 
together based on similarities in immigration policy and their nativist rhetoric, it seems 
like a week foundation for a family.  
 
Even if so, it is difficult to definitively conclude that the PRRPs are not a family. 
Primarily as the concept of party families is both vague and undertheorised. Research 
has still not agreed on how many party families there should be, what relevant criteria or 
core characteristics parties should meet, and how permissive party families should be 
considering deviations.258 Indeed, this study highlights this problem. As long as research 
on party families is not developed, judgements about party familiarity will be rather 
subjective. Scholars will therefore continue to reach different conclusions concerning 
the PRRP family - not necessarily based on different research results, but based on the 
scholar’s more or less permissive attitude towards anomalies.   
 
Finally, when political actors try to limit the nativist influence of PRRPs, they generally 
focus on immigration policy.259 This thesis results indicate that they should also focus 
on cultural policy - at least regarding the branch of PRRPs that underpins their nativist 
ideology with political substance. Besides that cultural policy is considered as a core 
political instrument to reach nativist objectives, previous research shows that influential 
PRRPs have reached considerable influence in the area.260 That is, it seems probable 
that the considerable gap between these PRRPs’ and general political parties’ interest in- 
and understanding of cultural policy generates a wide scope of cultural policy action 
possibilities for PRRPs. 
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